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Abstract
The post- Cold War international security environment has changed dramatically however, 
the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) continues to be one of the major 
global challenges and threats to security. In 2003, the European Union declared in the Euro-
pean Security Strategy (ESS) its aim to promote “effective multilateralism”, and established a 
strategic partnership with China. Focusing on major current multilateral regimes in export 
controls, this policy paper uses China as a case country and provides an overview of the 
development of China’s export control policies. It then discusses the implications of pro-
moting European norms and paradigms such as multilateralism to China, especially in the 
area of international export controls. 
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I. Introduction1 
The international security environment has dramatically changed with the end of the 
Cold War. However, with the deepening processes of globalization and the increas-
ing flows of trade, technology and people across national and regional borders, the 
post-Cold War world has witnessed new, less visible and global challenges to securi-
ty. Therefore, the traditionally clear border between internal and external security is 
increasingly blurred, as any single country or region would be unable to tackle on its 
own these complex security problems which are different from massive visible threats 
like wars and military attacks. For instance, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-
struction (WMD) including nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and missiles is one 
of these more complex security challenges that have called for more efficient inter-
national cooperation by countries and regions, within the framework of the current 
multilateral export control regimes.
The risk of proliferation of WMDs is widely recognized as one of the threats to interna-
tional peace and security. On April 28 2004, the United Nations recognized the import-
ant role of export controls in preventing WMD proliferation by adopting the UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1540 on ‘Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’ 
(UNSC Resolution 2004). In December 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was 
adopted in which the EU aimed to respond to the new security environment after the 
Cold War and in particularly the September 11 attacks. The ESS, the first official doc-
ument of its kind, stated that Europe was faced with “new threats which are more di-
verse, less visible and less predictable”(Coucil of the European Union 2003: 2); among 
the five key threats listed in the ESS, the proliferation of WMDs ranked second after 
terrorism and was considered to be “potentially the greatest threat to our security” 
(Coucil of the European Union 2003: 3). Five years later in 2008, the EU issued its report 
on the implementation of the ESS and proliferation of WMDs ranked as the top one of 
the global challenges and threats in the report; and the risk “has increased in the last 
five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure” (Coucil of the European 
Union 2008: 3). Therefore, current major international export control regimes face the 
challenge of curbing, managing or at least slowing the spread of WMDs and delivery 
systems.
That partly explained why the EU in 2003 aimed to promote “an international order 
based on effective multilateralism”, meaning “the  development of a stronger inter-
national society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based inter-
1 A draft of this working paper was presented at the Asia-Pacific Association for EU Studies (EUSA-Asia 
Pacific) Annual Conference for 2012, „EU‘s Unknown Asia: New Horizons and New Beginnings“, Sin-
gapore, 4th- 5th of June 2012. The author would like to thank Dr. May-Britt U. Stumbaum, Head of 
the NFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of the EU”, for her insights and feedback for this working 
paper; many thanks also to Prof. Dr. Ting Wai, Department of Government and International Studies, 
Hong Kong Baptist University of China, and Dr. Wenwen Shen, Research Fellow of EU-Asia Centre at 
Brussels. 
Thanks also to Katharina Arseven, and my other NFG colleagues- Florian Britsch, Olivia Gippner, Garima 
Mohan, Dominique Marr and Julia Teebken for their support. Last but surely not the least, the author 
would also like to thank the two anonymous peer viewers of this working paper for their comments and 
suggestions.
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national order” (Coucil of the European Union 2003: 9). To achieve these goals, the EU is 
committed to upholding and developing international law, with the United Nations Charter 
as the fundamental framework for international relations and wants “international organ-
isations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace 
and security” (Coucil of the European Union 2003: 9). The ESS stated that “it is a condition 
of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as 
proliferation” (Coucil of the European Union 2003: 10). At the same time, the EU believed 
it needs to “work with others” to pursue its objectives “both through multilateral coopera-
tion in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors”, as it stated 
that  “international cooperation is a necessity”(Coucil of the European Union 2003: 11; 13). 
Besides the “irreplaceable” transatlantic relationship, the ESS stated that the EU in particular 
“should look to develop strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India as well 
as with all those who share our goals and values” (Coucil of the European Union 2003: 14). 
As China grows in global influence, it is important for the European Union to forge a close 
and cooperative relationship with it. The EU and China had jointly launched a comprehensive 
strategic partnership in 2003. However, when their bilateral relationship was established in 
1975, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has just acquired its seat in the United Nations 
(UN) and membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) relatively recently in 
1971, and was still out of many other important international organizations and regimes. 
Since its adoption of the reform and opening-up policy (Gaige Kaifang Zhengce) in the late 
1970s, China’s relations with the world have gradually undergone historic changes. For exam-
ple, in 1984 China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in 2001 China’s 
final access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicated its increasing integration in 
international society. As of 2011, China follows the US as the second largest world economy in 
terms of its total GDP (The World Bank 2011). As an emerging power both economically and 
militarily, China seems willing in its official statements to play its role as a ‘global responsible 
power’ in contributing to peace and stability in the region and the world at large. 
To promote the norms such as “effective multilateralism” mentioned in the ESS, the EU should 
and must take into consideration China’s policy in areas like international non-proliferation. 
So, what developments has China made in its non- proliferation control policies in the past 
few years? What implications could there be for the EU which is pursuing a goal of promoting 
effective multilateralism in international non-proliferation and export controls? 
This policy paper first gives a brief introduction of current major multilateral export control 
regimes, and then provides an overview of the development of China’s export control poli-
cies, including its participation in these regimes as well as its national legal system. Based on 
these, this study finally discusses and explores the implications for the EU as a promoter of 
effective multilateralism when it engages China in international non-proliferation controls. 
This study is also expects to contribute to current research on the EU’s common foreign pol-
icy in engaging an emerging China and in developing the EU-China strategic partnership in 
the particular policy area of non-proliferation.
It argues that China as an emerging power has gradually changed its attitudes to, and par-
ticipated in, some of the current major multilateral regimes of non-proliferation controls 
such as the IAEA. Besides these gradual and yet important developments, China has also 
established its national law system and policies and worked along with the international 
society in this area- for instance, by establishing a bilateral dialogue with the EU in this 
8 | NFG Working Paper No. 02| January 2013 
area. However, China’s interpretations of and attitudes to current major multilateral 
non-proliferation regimes might still be partly shaped by its lasting belief in bilateral 
diplomacy; while on the other hand, to China the EU might not have acted as a (suc-
cessful) promoter of European norms such as “effective multilateralism” in internation-
al non-proliferation controls area. Some implications for the EU and its future policy 
to China in the multilateral non-proliferation controls would include overcoming the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis- which adversely impacts Chinese perceptions of the 
EU, and enhancing the bilateral dialogue mechanism for non-proliferation within the 
established structures of the EU-China partnership, as well as working with others like 
the US to improve the EU’s role in multilateral export control regimes in which China 
has and is willing to participate. With gradual and considerable progress made in the 
past, China’s participation and more importantly its role in international non-prolifera-
tion will test the EU’s efforts and capabilities in ensuring multilateral regimes are more 
effective.
II. Major International Non-proliferation Regimes
According to Richard H. Ullman, national security in the Cold War times was primarily 
defined “in excessively narrow and excessively military terms”, which however “conveys 
a profoundly false image of reality” (Ullman 1983: 129). It is true, because if the states 
concentrate on military threats while ignoring other dangers, their security as a whole 
would be adversely affected; on the other hand, a narrow understanding of security 
might cause militarization in international relations and only increase world insecurity 
in the long run. Thus, a narrow understanding of the security concept seems to be both 
misleading and dangerous. After the end of the Cold War, the changing global security 
environment demanded a redefinition of the concept of security, which to some extent 
indicated an expansion and broadened understanding of the challenges and threats the 
world faces today. Therefore, security is not only defined in the traditional military sense, 
but is also closely related to non-traditional threats such as climate change, terrorism 
and proliferation of WMDs. Besides, nation states are no longer the only actors involved 
in security with a resurgence of non-state actors including international organizations 
and individuals.
The Copenhagen School developed an analysis of security studies, and examined the 
distinctive character of security in five sectors including “military, political, economic, 
environmental and societal”(Buzan et al. 1998: Preface,vii.). Their research thus rejected 
traditional understanding of security, which was often restricted to one sector. The wider 
understanding of the security concept include both the traditional and non-traditional 
threats to the post- Cold War world, and this was also reflected in the 2003 ESS which 
considered proliferation of WMDs as one of the major global threats (Coucil of the 
European Union 2003: 2; 3). As the world is linked more closely, strengthening inter-
national cooperation and thus seeking common security for all calls for international 
cooperation in non-proliferation.  
As of today, there are a number of multilateral non-proliferation regimes whose par-
ticipants (mainly States) work together to organize their non-proliferation systems. For 
example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up in 1957 to promote 
                           Mapping China‘s Place in Multilateral Export Control Regimes: 
Policy Implications for the European Union  | 9
safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. Among many such regimes, the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly known as the Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty or NPT) entered into force in 1970 aiming to promote non-proliferation, 
disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. Extended indefinitely 
on 11 May 1995, the NPT with 190 parties including all the five UNSC permanent mem-
bers, was considered “the most universal disarmament and arms control agreement” 
(UNODA 2012). Due to the nature of actual or potential military applications and eco-
nomic gains, proliferation of WMDs might be due to a country, an organization, or 
even individuals. This causes national and international concerns about the declared or 
suspected end use or the end user of the WMDs, and even of conventional arms. Also, 
dual-use technologies which can be used for both civil and military purpose might be 
applied as the means of WMD delivery. Effective controls in non-proliferation thus have 
a constructive impact upon addressing these various threats, and are compatible with 
the common interest of the international community. 
The NPT performs a vital function in helping ensure the peaceful use of nuclear mate-
rial and equipment. At the same time, some additional measures have been adopted to 
strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime in managing the 
acquiring of the capability to produce nuclear weapons. According to the time of their 
establishment, some other export controls regimes are as follows: 
1. The Zangger Committee (ZAC) established in 1971 “essentially contributes to the in-
terpretation” of article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT, which “offers guidance to all parties 
to the Treaty” (ZAC 2012b). It stipulates and updates the conditions and procedures 
for controlling export of nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-
weapon states yet to accede to the NPT. And if the IAEA safeguards are applied to the 
recipient facility, nuclear items may be exported according to its “Trigger List” (because 
such exports trigger the requirement for safeguards). 
On October 16, 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee currently with thirty-eight 
member states and the European Commission as a permanent observer (ZAC 2012a). 
The Committee has enabled it to work with other major nuclear non-proliferation re-
gimes, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in which the Chair of the Zangger Commit-
tee participates as an observer.
2. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): established in 1974, it aims to prevent the export 
and re-transfer of nuclear materials or technology for peaceful purposes from being 
misused, such as for nuclear weapon development. According to its “Nuclear Transfer 
Guidelines” and “Nuclear Dual-use Material Trigger List”, each respectively as Part 1 and 
Part 2 of IAEA Document INFCIRC/254 (NSG 2012a), the Group works to ensure coor-
dination among major nuclear suppliers, and strengthen their nuclear export control 
mechanisms; on the other hand, it requires importing states to accept the IAEA’s full-
scope safeguards. By doing so, the AG thus will contribute to preventing or controlling 
the proliferation of sensitive nuclear items and technology. 
Currently the NSG has forty-six participating governments, of which China became a 
member in 2004. The European Commission is another observer of the Group apart 
from the Chair of the Zangger Committee (NSG 2012c). The NSG holds annual plenary 
meetings to review the Guidelines and Trigger List, which however are implemented 
by each Participating Government “in accordance with its national laws and practices” 
(NSG 2012b).
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3. The Australia Group (AG) was established to prevent the direct or inadvertent prolif-
eration of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW). With Australia acting as permanent 
chair, all states participating in the Group are parties to the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The AG has established its 
“Common Control Lists” (AG 2012b) and “Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical 
or Biological Items” (AG 2012c), and therefore the member countries can coordinate 
their national export control measures to fulfill their obligations in non-proliferation of 
CBWs.
Since 1985 when the Group was established, the European Commission has been a par-
ticipant. China ratified the CWC in 1984 and then the BWC in 1997, however it is not a 
member of the AG currently. The AG holds annual meetings to exchange information 
and intelligence on export control and discuss implementation and enforcement mea-
sures, including AG’s common control lists. However, participants in the Group “do not 
undertake any legally binding obligations”, therefore “the effectiveness of the coopera-
tion depends solely on a shared commitment to CBW non-proliferation goals and the 
strength of their respective national measures” (AG 2012a).
4. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987, and cur-
rently has thirty four member countries. It focuses on controlling the transfer of missile 
equipment, material, and related technologies for systems capable of delivering WMDs. 
To achieve such goals, the MTCR Guidelines and other regulations provide guidance 
and reference for member countries, and those non-members who unilaterally follow 
the Guidelines, to coordinate their national export licensing efforts to prevent WMD 
proliferation (MTCR 2012a).
As a multinational export control regime for missiles and missile-related technology 
used for the delivery of WMDs, the MTCR’s decisions regarding whether to admit a new 
partner are based on consensus of its member states. Also, this regime does not offer 
an observer category (MTCR 2012b). Therefore, so far neither the European Commission 
nor China has been an observer or member of the MTCR.
5. The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is the successor of the Coordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which was set up by the Western bloc to en-
able an arms embargo on the former Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War, and 
ceased to exist in 1994. Established in 1996, the WA aims to function “by promoting 
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use 
goods and technologies” (WA 2012a). In this sense, it is different from the above men-
tioned four regimes in controlling the proliferation of WMDS, and focuses on a special 
area of non-proliferation. 
As a multinational export control regime, the Arrangement has established and updated 
a series of Guidelines and Procedures, including the Initial Elements (WA 2012c), and its 
“Control Lists of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List” (WA 2012b). But 
on the other hand, transfer of any item listed in the WA’s documents depends solely on 
the practice of each member state. Another point to notice is that till today, China and 
the European Commission have been out of this Arrangement which includes forty one 
member states.
From a brief introduction above, since the 1970s many international regimes such as 
the NPT and the IAEA have been established and maintained. Among the five regimes 
mentioned in this paper, there are four aiming to manage or reduce WMD prolifera-
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tion- both the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group focus on controls 
of nuclear related technology, while the Australia Group works for controls of chemical 
and biological weapon technology, and the Missile Technology Control Regime aim to 
control missiles and other deliveries for WMDs. The Wassenaar Arrangement is signifi-
cant on controls of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Therefore, 
the Arrangement can assist and complement the other four major international export 
control regimes in the field of international non-proliferation (see below Table I: Tasks 
of the Five International Regimes in Non-proliferation Controls).
Table I: Tasks of the Five International Regimes in Non-proliferation Controls
 (Source: “Overview” of the Wassenaar Arrangement. http://www.wassenaar.org/intro-
duction/overview.html; Accessed May l9, 2012.)
However, the above mentioned five regimes in arms control and nonproliferation of 
WMDs have at least two disadvantages, among others: First, the number of participat-
ing parties in these regimes is still limited, compared to the total number of states in 
the world. For example, among the five regimes the MTCR with thirty- four members 
has the smallest number, while the NSG is the largest with only forty- six members. For 
other non-participant countries, they either choose to or are kept out of these interna-
tional cooperation forums. This, to a large extent, endangers the nature of these regimes 
as multilateral ones. Secondly, the effectiveness of these regimes depends greatly on 
their participating governments who choose and decide to implement these regimes’ 
guidelines and regulations, modified according to individual national interest and thus 
formulate different national security strategies. For example, the WA has no binding 
force to determine whether a country can transfer or deny transfer of the items listed in 
its documents. This means that transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies 
depend solely on the WA member states, which might be more concerned trade and ac-
cruing economic gains than regional and world security. 
Thus, related to these two problems, one can argue that these multilateral regimes have 
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the following features. First, they exist mainly as informal intergovernmental forums or 
groups consisting mostly, if not exclusively of countries, whereas non-state actors like 
international organizations and NGOs are not included in the membership. Even if the 
European Commission participates in some of them, either as a member (for instance 
the AG), or an observer (in the ZAC and the NSG), the EU as a whole has no seats in the 
MTCR and the WA. Actually, many EU member states like the UK, France and Germany 
have joined these regimes as individual countries. This may well again indicate the inter-
governmental nature of these regimes rather than being multilateral in a broader sense. 
The second feature of these regimes is that almost all of them were set up during the 
Cold War period, with the WA set up in 1996 as the successor of the COCOM established 
shortly after the end of World War II. This might partly explain why during the Cold War 
China as one of the socialist countries did not join these regimes. Ideological affiliation 
impacted the inclusivity and nature of these regimes, as China saw it. However, after the 
Cold War China as one of the five UNSC Permanent Members possessing WMDs has 
only joined two of the five current major international export control regimes, namely 
the ZAC and the NSG. If China remains or is kept out of the other three, would it impact 
their ability and effectiveness to act as ‘multilateral’ regimes in promoting regional and 
world security? Also, could there be joint international efforts of controlling prolifera-
tions of WMD and dual- use products and technologies without Chinese participation? 
A clear picture of the features of these regimes might be shown in Table IV in Part III be-
low. This study plans not to dwell on the regimes and their arrangements per se, which 
deserve a separate and detailed study. Instead, it proposes to take a closer look at the 
development of China’s non-proliferation policy and controls and then place it in the 
context of the China-EU strategic partnership before assessing the implications of the 
above on the EU’s policy of effective multilateralism with respect to China. 
III. China’s Policy in Non-Proliferation Controls: an Overview 
This part provides an overview of China’s export control policy after its Opening-up 
and Reform Policy of the late 1970s. Drawing on current studies by Chinese and for-
eign scholars and research institutions, this paper intends to focus on two things: first, 
China’s participation in and involvement with current major international non-prolif-
eration regimes; and second, the development of China’s national legal basis for non- 
proliferation. Therefore, some of the Chinese government reports will be used as ref-
erences for this trace study, such as the White Papers on China’s National Defence and 
its non-proliferation policy. In doing this, this study expects to trace gradual changes 
in China’s attitudes to, and compliance with, the existing international regimes and 
regulations for controlling WMD proliferation, for arms control as well as delivery tech-
nologies.
1. China and Multilateral Non-Proliferation Mechanisms
Almost two decades after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded, China suc-
cessively developed its own WMDs like nuclear weapons. It carried out its first nuclear 
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test in 1964 and first hydrogen bomb test in 1967. However, China’s official statement 
issued after its first atomic test on October 16, 1964, “The Atomic Bomb, Statement 
of the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, seems to have set the tone for 
China’s non-proliferation policy for the following two decades. It declared China’s stand 
against ‘imperialism’ and the nuclear monopoly by the erstwhile superpowers like the 
US and the Soviet Union, and emphasized China’s rights to develop nuclear weapons. 
And it stated that “the status and development of China being a nuclear power would 
contribute to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons” (Chinese government 
notification, 1964). 
Since the 1970s, after establishing diplomatic relations with the West, particularly the US 
and the EU (then the European Economic Community, EEC), and the restoration of its 
seat in the UNSC, China has broadened its relations with the world. After its Opening-
up and Reform Policy of the late 1970s, China started to cautiously and selectively enter 
the international non-proliferation regimes. In 1984 it joined the IAEA, which signified a 
major change of attitude to international nuclear non-proliferation. In 1992, China rati-
fied the NPT, and was recognized as one of the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). In 
1995, China declared “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nucle-
ar-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances” 
(the UN S/1995/265 1995). After signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 
1996, China also joined the Zangger Committee in 1997. 
Its significance lies in that this is the first full participation of China in an international 
export control rule-making body. Since then, China has “maintained a good record of 
participation in and adherence to its obligations in the Zangger Committee” (CITS 2005). 
In 2004, China became a full member of the NSG, which marked another important 
step for China’s international participation in non- proliferation regimes. Therefore, the 
accession to the NPT and other relevant international regimes showed China’s greater 
willingness to join the international community to control nuclear non-proliferation, 
and on the other hand China’s positive compliance with these regimes and regulations 
was also recognized. 
In the areas of controlling the spread of biological and chemical weapons, China ratified 
the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1984, signed the CWC in 1993 
and then ratified it in 1997. However, as mentioned before, China still remains outside 
the AG, a regime controlling the export of biological and chemical weapons. In May 
2000, Sha Zukang, the then Director-General of Arms Control & Disarmament of the 
Chinese Ministry of foreign Affairs (MFA), argued that the CWC was “simply the first step 
towards the realisation of humankind’s common goal of eliminating chemical weapons 
once and for all”(Sha 2000: 18). But, he added that “the existence of the ‘Australia Group’ 
means that, at this moment, there are two parallel export control mechanisms in the 
field of chemical trade”; therefore the “conflicts between the relevant provisions of the 
Convention and those of the ‘Australia Group’ inevitably causes confusion and disputes 
in what would otherwise be normal trade activities, results in a de facto imbalance in the 
rights enjoyed by individual States Parties, undercuts the authority of the Convention, 
discourages the participation of more countries in the Convention’s regime, and com-
promises its universality” (Sha 2000: 17). This represented China’s criticism of the AG as 
discriminatory in its practices and it conflict with treaty-based norms and practices in 
the CWC. Although in 2004, a policy statement on the website of MFA stated that “China 
shared the AG’s non-proliferation goals” (MFA 2004), it remains a non-member of the 
AG till today. 
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In the area of controlling the transfers of missile and missile-related delivery technology, 
China has maintained communications with the MTCR and the relationship between 
the two sides has made some progress. For example, in the early 1990s, China became 
an ‘adherent’ to the MTCR “in response to U.S. pressure and sanctions”, but it “contin-
ued to criticize the regimes as discriminatory and for promoting double-standards” (Da-
vis 2005: 7). Later in September 2003, however, China expressed its willingness to join 
the MTCR, when Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing sent a letter to the then-Chair of 
the group, that Beijing would consider applying for MTCR membership. In 2004, China 
held two rounds of dialogues with the MTCR in February and June (MFA 2007), and in 
September, China applied for membership in the MTCR. However, Beijing’s bid was 
declined after these dialogues, and China is not a member of the MTCR yet. Neither 
did it join the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, although China “is open to dialogues and exchanges 
with the Arrangement and its participants” (MFA 2004), and both parties have held three 
rounds of dialogues respectively in April 2004, May 2005 and June 2006.
In general, as shown in Table II below, during the past decades since China joined the 
IAEA in 1984, it has showed a more receptive attitude to international non-proliferation 
regimes. China’s entry to the NPT, the ZAC and the NSG before 2004, and its willing-
ness to join the MTCR and WA around the same year, are notable developments both for 
these multilateral regimes and for the country’s non-proliferation policy.
Table II: China’s Profile in Major Multilateral Non-proliferation Regimes
International regimes Signed Ratified Joined Dialogues/ 
Year 
the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) 
1984
the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) 
1984
the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC)
1993 1997
the Comprehensive Test 
BanTreaty (CTBT) 
1996
the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT)
1992
the Zangger Committee (ZAC) 1997
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the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group(NSG) 
2004
The Australia Group (AG) 1/2004
The Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) 
2/2004
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) 3/2004-2006
(Based on source from the Arms Control Association’s website at http://www.armscon-
trol.org, and “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China”, see http://www.armscon-
trol.org/factsheets/chinaprofile, Accessed April 18, 2012; data sorted by Jizhou Zhao)
2. Development of China’s National Policy in Non-Proliferation
Besides China’s participation in as well as its willingness to join the above multilateral 
regimes in export controls, China’s national policy in this regard has gone through 
several notable stages as well. According to an early study by a Chinese scholar, China’s 
nuclear non-proliferation policy development experienced three distinct periods: 1) 
emphasis on the national right to develop nuclear weapons (1949-1959); 2) acceptance 
of the non-proliferation norm and independence from the international non-prolifera-
tion regime (1959-1984); and 3) gradual integration with the international community 
(from 1984 on) (Zhu 1997: 44-48). This last classification can be proved by the above 
mentioned introduction to China’s engagement with multilateral regimes. However, 
the three periods mainly indicated China’s non- proliferation policy in nuclear rather 
than other areas like biological and chemical exports, and they covered only the earlier 
developments of China’s export control policy. 
Comparatively, foreign studies on this appear to be more comprehensive Jonathan E. 
Davis argues that China’s export control system has evolved in four stages: “1) de facto 
export control, from 1949-1979; 2) ad hoc export control, from 1979 to 1995; 3) the devel-
opment of de jure strategic trade controls, from 1995 through 2002; and 4) the imple-
mentation of de jure controls and increasing interactions with the multilateral regimes, 
from 2002 on” (Davis 2005: 3). These findings broadened the understanding of China’s 
overall national export control policy, by not being restricted to the nuclear non-prolif-
eration policy. Also, the research focused more on the construction and implementation 
of China’s relevant legal system than on China’s gradual participation in some interna-
tional regimes. Therefore, the research provided a valuable reference for understanding 
China’s non- proliferation policy from different perspective.
According to the research goal of this paper, it is necessary to have a look at China’s of-
ficial declarations which indicate its commitments of adhering to and enhancing mul-
tilateral regimes of non-proliferation. Actually, in the early decades after the establish-
ment of the PRC, China had a limited national export controls policy and regulations. 
For example, in December 1950 the then-Ministry of Foreign Trade issued China’s first 
export control - related guideline, “The Provisional Rules of Foreign Trade Administra-
tion” (Duiwai Maoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli). This regulation required Chinese importers 
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and exporters to obtain licenses from foreign trade authorities at either the provincial 
or central governmental level (Hu 1994: 6). Obviously, this kind of policy reflected Chi-
na’s concerns about trade rather than security, especially in the long periods of China’s 
Planned Economy (Jihua Jingji).
1995 marked a milestone in China’s export control developments. After the end of the 
Cold War, in November 1995 China issued a white paper “China: Arms Control and Dis-
armament”, which is the first Chinese government declaration of its non-proliferation 
strategy. The White Paper indicated that China had officially recognized its call for a 
“more systematic approach to manage sensitive trade” (White Paper of China’s Arms 
Control and Disarmament 1995). It also highlighted China’s commitments to interna-
tional non-proliferation regimes including the NPT, the agreements of IAEA’s safeguards, 
the BWC and the CWC. 
From 1998 till 2011, China has issued seven white papers on China’s National Defence 
every two years (see below Table III). Non-proliferation controls took on considerable 
significance in these government declarations, especially after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. For example, the white paper “China’s National Defence in 2002” 
declared that China was “willing, together with the international community, to contrib-
ute to the maintenance of the legal system for international arms control and disarma-
ment” (State Council of China 2002). Also the White Paper promulgated regulations in 
export controls of missile, chemical and biological dual-use technology and arms, and 
thus indicated the active compliance of China’s export control policies with the guide-
lines and control lists of the AG, the NSG, and the MTCR, although in 2002 China were 
not members of any of these three regimes. Consensus within its policy circles seemed 
to grow that China’s national security interests and the region’s stability were increas-
ingly converging with international nonproliferation objectives. This can be proven by 
the 2003 White Paper “China’s Non-proliferation Policy and Measures”, the first of its 
kind to address China’s non- proliferation policy and to publicize its commitment to 
the world (State Council of China 2003). Possible explanations might include that China 
with its growing economic and political power needs to represent its image of a respon-
sible rising power to the region and the world. On the other hand, “a developing China 
needs both an international and peripheral environment of long term peace and stabil-
ity” (Xu 2004: 1-20). 
After 2004, China has many times expressed its support to current multilateral cooper-
ation framework like the UN’s role in the field of non-proliferation. For example, “Chi-
na’s National Defense in 2004” declared China’s support for safeguarding the extant 
non-proliferation regime and reinforcing the regime’s “effectiveness and authority” 
(State Council of China 2004). After the 2005 White Paper on “China’s Peaceful Devel-
opment”, which was revised in September 2011 (State Council of China 2011b), the 
White Paper on “China’s National Defense in 2006” declared that “China supports the 
UN in playing its due role in non-proliferation”(State Council of China 2006). And “Chi-
na’s National Defense in 2008” stated that it “is committed to ---- consolidating and 
strengthening the existing international arms control, disarmament and non-prolif-
eration mechanisms pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and other universally recognized norms governing international rela-
tions” (State Council of China 2009). “China’s National Defense in 2010” was published 
in March 2011, which stated China “adheres to the complete fulfilment of the UN’s role” 
in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and roles of “other 
related international organizations and multilateral mechanisms”, which “should be 
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consolidated and strengthened” (State Council of China 2011a).
In general, China has published many such official declarations which however need 
to be proven by actions. Nevertheless, this study would argue that these declarations 
at least demonstrate China’s increasing understanding of the value and significance of 
international non-proliferation norms, and its growing willingness to join in and sup-
port international non-proliferation practices. Therefore, China’s attitudes to multilateral 
non-proliferation regimes have undergone gradual yet dramatic changes. For example, 
in the earlier years China cautiously chose to join some international non-proliferation 
regimes like the IAEA in 1984 and the NPT in 1992. And its memberships in these re-
gimes helped China achieve the goal of being more integrated in the international sys-
tem. Since the 2000s when China joined the NSG, it gradually reduced its criticism of 
the regimes as discriminatory and imperialistic as well. Also, after the mid-2000s even 
though China appeared not so keen as before to join the AG, the MTCR and the WA, it 
did place more emphasis on the role of the UN and stressed the strengthening of exist-
ing regimes in non-proliferation. 
But, what implications would there be for the EU in promoting effective multilateralism 
to the world including China, in the area of international non-proliferation?
Table III: China’s White Papers on National Defence/ Non-Proliferation (1995-2011)
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address China’s non- prolif-
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Commitment to uphold the UN 
Charter and other universally rec-
ognized norms governing interna-
tional relations 
March 2011 Information 





Adherence to the complete fulfil-
ment of the UN’s role and those 
of other related international 
organizations and multilateral 
mechanisms
(Sources: Websites of Chinese Defense Ministry, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/book.
htm Accessed April 18, 2012; data sorted out Jizhou Zhao)
IV. Implications for China’s Participation in Multilateral Non-Proliferation for the EU
As argued above China, being a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear-weapon 
state signatory of the NPT, has participated in and communicated with many of cur-
rent major international regimes. During these processes, China improved its national 
export control policy (see Appendix) by introducing international norms and relevant 
regulation as well. It increased its compliance with international export controls stan-
dards, and repeatedly expressed in government declarations its commitment to adher-
ing to and enhancing these regimes. A report in 2005 provided a fairly comprehen-
sive introduction of China’s export controls, including its legal basis, licensing system, 
enforcement, government-to-industry outreach and international participation (Davis 
2005). And some held that China’s export control system had evolved significantly since 
the early 1980s (Medeiros 2005). However, there was both “discernible progress and dis-
parity” (Cupitt 2003; Cupitt/Murayama 1997: 117- 142) between Chinese export control 
regulations and international standards. “During the past China has strengthened its 
export control regime. In response, private companies have replaced state-owned cor-
porations as the leading proliferators, thus posing challenges both to China and to the 
world”(Evron 2010). 
Actually, a research early in 1995 examined the gap between China’s declared non-pro-
liferation policy and its “failure to put an end to controversial exports” (Davis 1995: 587- 
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603). An evaluation of Chinese non-proliferation export controls even argued that the 
Chinese export control system was still “nascent and largely obscured” (Richard T. Cu-
pitt/Murayama 1998). On March 19, 2012, the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) published a report, which showed that China’s “decline in imports co-
incided with an increase in arms exports”, and “the outflow of Chinese-made weapons 
jumped by 95 per cent” (Holtom et al. 2012). But on March 27, 2012 China released 
a government report during the Nuclear Security Summit (26 – 27 March, 2012). The 
report dealt with China’s progress in improving nuclear security in the past two years 
(Xinhua Net 2012). Therefore, it is not hard to notice a gap between official statements 
and factual enforcements in Chinese non-proliferation policies, which would harm the 
effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes, such as the authority, implemen-
tation and enforcement of their regulations. Fan (2008:40) argues that major powers 
should “change their negative attitudes toward or export control policy against China”, 
and “encourage and support china’s membership in multilateral export control regime 
to further its nonproliferation cooperation with major powers”.  
So, is the EU one of the actors promoting the norm of effective multilateralism to en-
sure China participates in international non-proliferation regimes? The answer may be 
yes, at least for many European scholars. Since the early 1970s, the EU (then the EC) was 
termed as a “civilian power” that “in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the 
influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essen-
tially civilian forms of power”(Duchêne 1973: 19). Since  the EC had gained significant 
economic strength with the success of economic integration, it was seen by the US 
President Richard Nixon as one of the five major economic powers in the world. For 
others like Hans Maull however, a “civilian power” was not merely an economic power, 
but also a promoter of norms and values like democracy aiming to “civilize international 
relations” (Maull 1990: 129- 153). Similar arguments were developed after 2000, trying 
to conceptualize the identity of the EU as a “normative power” attempting to diffuse 
European norms and values by ways of “contagion, information diffusion, procedural 
diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and the cultural filter”(Manners 2002: 244-245). 
All these arguments shared an understanding that the EU enjoyed its capacity to influ-
ence others but with a preference to use civilian/ normative forms of power. Thus, these 
ideas in essence incorporate the “soft power” concept, which is “the ability to get what 
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004: x). After the 
Cold War ended, the EU sought to strengthen its role on the global stage depending 
more on its soft power in international relations. Till 2003, the EU had already estab-
lished a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for about ten years, while the Eu-
ropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP; renamed European Common Security and 
Defence Policy, or CSDP, with entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in December 2009) as 
an integral part of CFSP had gone through four years since its initiation in 1999. Thus 
the CFSP, especially the ESDP, to some extent enabled the EU to develop and use its 
(limited) military power. But the 2003 Iraq War unilaterally started by the US produced 
many repercussions, one of them being that the EU explicitly stated to be “inevitably 
a global player” (Coucil of the European Union 2003). Instead, to address the complex 
post-Cold War security environment the EU not only placed great emphasis on military 
power and policy tools, but also claimed to enhance multilateralism by supporting the 
UN and other international organizations and regimes, and by establishing a number 
of strategic partnerships with countries including China which had been listed in the 
“BRICs” (O’Neill 2001).
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China- EU relations were established in 1975, when the EU was being conceptualized 
within Europe as a civilian power with particular focus in its economic strength rather 
than military force, and with the US-led NATO providing security. Since the EU and 
China signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 1985, their relations have focused 
more on trade and economic areas, than security. Even though the EU has kept in place 
the Arms Embargo to China since 1989, global security issues such as non-proliferation 
are not on top of the agenda for both parties. As shown in Table IV, in the five major in-
ternational non-proliferation and arms control regimes, China and the EU participated 
in only some of them, which prevented the both parties from meeting and communicat-
ing adequately in these international forums. 
Table IV: The Five Non-Proliferation Regimes and Profiles of China / the EU






ZA/1971 38 countries, plus 
one observer
Joined in 1997 Observer
NSG/1974 46 countries, plus 
two observers
Joined in 2004 Observer
AG/1985 41 parties, inc. 
the European 
Commission
-- Participant since 
1985
MTCR/1987 34 countries -- --
WA/1996  
COCOM/1950-1994
41 countries -- --
(Source from websites of the five regimes2 ; data sorted out by Jizhou Zhao)
When entering this new century, the North Korean and Iranian Nuclear issues remain 
unsettled, while the potential combination of terrorists armed with WMDs caused great 
concerns in the world, especially after the September 11. The international community 
has deepened a consensus on achieving the goal of preventing proliferation of WMDs. 
2 The ZAC,  http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Seiten/default.aspx 
TheAG, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html
The NSG,  http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm
The MTCR, http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html 
The WA, http://www.wassenaar.org/ 
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First, on the global level, on April 28 2004 the UNSC Resolution 1540 of “Non-prolifer-
ation of weapons of mass destruction” was passed, which indicated the international 
community’s recognition of the importance of export controls. Second, at the regional 
level, the European Council adopted on 12 December 2003 a “European Strategy against 
the proliferation of WMD” in parallel with the adoption of the ESS. The WMD Strategy 
provided a full-fledged roadmap for immediate and future action in the fight against 
proliferation. In fact, after 2003 the EU has formulated and issued many other regula-
tions for preventing proliferation of WMD and controlling arms transfer, as shown in 
Table V below.







Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction  (in 
parallel with the adoption 
of the ESS)
Five priorities including:--Strengthen-
ing the international non-proliferation 
system;  
--Pursuing universalization of multilat-
eral agreements; --Reinforcing strict 
implementation of and compliance 
with these agreements; and  
--Co-operating closely with key 
partners; 
since Autumn 





Negotiations with Iran on its nuclear 
program 
Supports the High Representative of 
CFSP and the three EU Member States 




Concept Paper A WMD Monitoring Centre to monitor 
and enhance further the consistent 
implementation of the EU WMD 
Strategy 





“New lines for action by 
the EU in combating the 
proliferation of WMD and 
their delivery systems” 
To increase the efficiency of the EU 
WMD Strategy by achieving greater 
coordination within it
To continue cooperation with interna-
tional organizations and third coun-
tries to help improve non-proliferation 
policies and export controls.




Adopted a note on the implementa-
tion of the WMD Clause
December 
2009/EEAS 
the consistency of EU ac-
tion in the WMD field 
Guaranteed by the EEAS 
December 
2009/EEAS
the consistency of EU ac-
tion in the WMD field 







Negotiations with Iran on 
its nuclear program
Since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009, and the estab-
lishment of the EEAS in 2010
2010 consortium established Made up of leading non-proliferation 
think-tanks established 
Currently on-going Council Joint 
Actions 
Support to the IAEA, the OPCW and the 
CTBTO, and in support of the BTWC 
and UNSC Resolution 1540. 
(Source: the EEAS http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/non-
proliferation,-disarmament-and-export-control-/wmd?lang=en accessed July 30, 2012)
Third, at the bilateral level, one can take China- EU strategic partnership for example. 
Since both parties declared a strategic partnership in 2003, China and the EU (as well 
as some EU member states like the UK and Germany) have jointly issued declarations 
                           Mapping China‘s Place in Multilateral Export Control Regimes: 
Policy Implications for the European Union  | 23
on non-proliferation and arms control, held specific seminars on export controls and 
conducted many exchanges. These can be partly shown in Table VI below. For exam-
ple, in December 2004, China and the EU signed the “Joint declaration of the People’s 
Republic of China and the European Union on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control”, 
recognizing each other as “a major strategic partner in the area of disarmament and 
non-proliferation”, and identified five priority areas for specific cooperation, for example, 
“strengthening the international system of non-proliferation, pursuing universalization 
of multilateral agreements, reinforcing strict implementation of and compliance with 
these agreements, co-operating closely with key partners, assistance to third countries” 
(Council of the European Union 2004: 3). Following up this joint declaration, both par-
ties enhanced and deepened their cooperation in their pursuit of goals mentioned in 
the 2004 document, and promoted close policy dialogues at some levels on export con-
trol and relevant issues. For example, From 6 to 8 December 2010, an EU–China Export 
Control Seminar was held in Beijing, and the participants of the seminar included Chi-
nese representatives from government institutions, such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs (with represen-
tatives from both Beijing and from the provinces).
Table VI: China and the EU in Bilateral Cooperations of Non-proliferation Controls
Time Bilateral Cooperation in Non-
proliferation and Arms Control
Highlights





- Jointly safeguard the international 
arms control, disarmament and 
non proliferation regimes and step 
up consultation and coordination 
on the basis of mutual respect;
 -strengthen exchange and coop-
eration on non-proliferation and 
export control and the prevention 
of weaponization of and arms race 
in outer space; 
-jointly contribute to the resolu-
tion of the issue of anti personnel 
landmines and explosive remnants 
of war; and 
-enhance cooperation in imple-
menting the international arms 
control treaties. 
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December 
2003
Strategy Against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
in parallel with the adoption of 
the ESS; provides a fully-fledged 
roadmap for immediate and future 




Joint declaration of the People’s 
Republic of China and the 
European Union on Non prolif-
eration and Arms Control 
recognising each other as a major 
strategic partner in
disarmament and non-prolifera-
tion; identified five priority areas 
for specific cooperation 
2005 China-EU Export Control 
Seminar (Beijing) 
The first seminar as a step to fulfill 
the 2004 Joint Declaration 
November 
2006
China-EU Export Control 
Seminar (Suzhou, China)
The second one; MFA, the General 
Administration of Customs  of 
China/ the EU
January 2007 China-EU Export Control 
Seminar on Licensing and 
Industry Outreach (Chengdu, 
China) 
The first seminar to have in-
cluded the government – industry 
outreach
August 2007 Exchange Visit to the UK Chinese Officials and Experts in 
Export Controls
April 2008 China-EU Arms Control and 
Non-proliferation Seminar
Regional Nuclear issues, conven-
tional arms control, etc. 
September 
2008
China-EU Export Control 
Seminar on Licensing and 
Industry Outreach (Zhengzhou, 
China) 
The Second on government – in-
dustry outreach; between Chinese 
MFA, Ministry of Commerce 
(MoC) and the EU 
December 
2010
China-EU Export Control 
Seminar (Beijing) 
Regional Nuclear issues, conven-
tional arms control, etc. 
(Data sorted out by Jizhou Zhao)
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From the development of China-EU cooperation in non-proliferation and arms control 
since the establishment of their partnership, the 2004 EU-China joint declaration was a 
notable milestone in EU-China relations. As the joint declaration stated, China and the 
EU are “important forces in the field of international security, bear significant respon-
sibility for the maintenance of international and regional peace, security and stability” 
(Council of the European Union 2004: 3), and should play a positive role in promoting 
the international non-proliferation process. Therefore, strengthening cooperation be-
tween China and the EU is not only conducive to expanding and deepening their com-
prehensive strategic partnership, but also to the current multilateral non-proliferation 
process. Based on the preliminary findings in this study on the development of China’s 
non-proliferation policy, and especially its international participation and cooperation in 
non-proliferation and arms control regimes, what roles can the EU play in promoting 
effective multilateralism to China in the field of international non-proliferation? 
As discussed in above, there are at least three levels of international cooperation in non-
proliferation and arms control. In this case, the EU perhaps could accordingly work in 
three aspects to engage China with building and enhancing the efficiency of multilateral 
regimes in the non-proliferation area. This paper would argue as follows:
1. At the global level, the EU may continue its support, together with China, of the UN to 
play an important role in non-proliferation. However, the EU as a whole is not a member 
of the UN or the UNSC, while the two EU member states (the UK and France) and China 
are the three of the five UNSC permanent members. So in many cases happening in the 
UN and among the UNSC, China will and even has too choose its EU counterparts (the 
UK, France) rather than the EU to communicate and cooperate with. Also, as discussed 
above, after the UNSC Resolution 1540 was passed in 2004, China frequently declared in 
its White Papers its support for enhancing the roles of the UN and major international 
regimes in non-proliferation. China’s willingness and commitment as such could be 
seen as a foundation for multilateral nonproliferation cooperation, but on the other 
hand, China so far has only joined two of the five nonproliferation regimes namely the 
ZAC and the NSG. As to the EU, it only has a membership in the AG and two observatory 
statuses in the ZAC and the NSG. Therefore, the EU could play a limited role in support-
ing the UN and the international regimes mentioned in this paper. The unequal status 
of the EU and China in multilateral regimes, that is, the EU as a non-state actor while 
China as a state especially in the specific area of nonproliferation, possibly indicates an 
uneasy task for the EU to influence China to participate in, and not to mention, improve 
the current arrangement of multilateral cooperation.
2. On the current major non-proliferation and arms control regimes, the EU (and its 
members states participating in non-proliferation regimes) could support China’s entry 
into the AG, the MTCR and the WA. China has conducted dialogues with AG, the MTCR 
and the WA from 2004-2006, which was also an important period of China – EU part-
nership. Therefore, China’s further integration with these regimes will be conducive to 
international non-proliferation efforts. On the other hand, what is more important for 
the EU’s stated goal of effective multilateralism is that it should work with others like 
the member states in these regimes, to help China fulfill its commitments with actual 
actions. This is not referring to some supervision over China’s responsibility from the EU, 
although it might be perceived like this by China. The enlargement or potential enlarge-
ment of current regimes in non-proliferation, with China’s often declared commitments, 
is the first step to promote the non-proliferation norms and regimes.
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3. At the regional and bilateral levels, the EU could support China’s positive and con-
structive role in facilitating a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue in the Korean 
peninsula. China has joined the NPT, the ZAC and the NSG, and if it makes efforts 
in persuading North Korea and Pakistan to join these multilateral export control re-
gimes, this would enlarge the membership, and possibly help improve the efficiency, of 
these regimes. For example, China should try to persuade the two countries as its close 
neighbors to (re)enter these regimes. For North Korea, it joined the NPT in 1985 but an-
nounced withdraws respectively in 1993 and in 2003; as to Pakistan, it has never joined 
the NPT although this country actually developed and possessed nuclear weapons of 
its own. If China could persuade North Korea to reenter, and/ or Pakistan to enter the 
NPT and other non-proliferation regimes, this would be a great contribution to regional 
and world peace. However, China tends to apply solutions like dialogue and negotia-
tions to peacefully solve the Korean Peninsula Nuclear issue; while the EU (as well as the 
US) aimed to “push China to exert greater pressure and more sanctions to North Korea” 
(Cheng 2011). In the Iranian Nuclear  In the past decades, China’s efforts have been in 
the direction of enhancing export control legislation; but this does not necessarily mean 
the gap between official lip-service and the facts of some private enterprises exporting 
sensitive items by escaping the government’s inspection has necessarily closed down.
As to the bilateral relations between China and the EU, both parties share a similar 
stance and common goals on non-proliferation of WMDs. After 2004 in particular, Chi-
na and the EU have held many dialogues and seminars on export controls. This is very 
positive and conducive to the development of their partnership; but on the other hand, 
the EU’s failure to remove its arms embargo to China damaged its good image in China. 
For example, some argued that “China should not perceive the EU in effect as a com-
plete strategic actor”, and the EU is only a “civilian power partly backed up by its limited 
military means” (Chen 2006: 8). This prevented a healthier development of the strategic 
partnership, but also constitutes an obstacle for the EU to engage China in multilateral 
and bilateral cooperation.
This said, however, the EU intends to increase its profile on the world stage with other 
efforts. For example the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy along 
with the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, were pres-
ent at the 2012 Seoul Security Summit in April, and they also jointly attended the four-
teenth China-EU Summit and met Chinese leaders. The EU has been working actively 
to engage China and also has participated in international forums of non-proliferation. 
But to what extent the EU could promote its norms such as effective multilateralism 
with respect to China, is still a question to be further explored.
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V. Conclusion
Since China is emerging in both economic strength and political significance, the extent 
of its participation in and willingness to join current international non-proliferation 
regimes will largely determine the range, level, efficiency of multilateral cooperation in 
this specific area.
The EU currently with 27 Member States represents in the world an example of interna-
tional cooperation among nation states. In the 2003 ESS, the EU stated its aim to pro-
mote effective multilateralism to the international community and launched a strategic 
partnership with China, in order to enhance international co-operation in addressing 
complex security challenges. 
This study as a policy paper thus chooses to offer some glimpse at current internation-
al non-proliferation controls regimes such as the NPT, the ZAC, the NSG, the AG, the 
MTCR and the WA. After a brief examination of China’s participation in these regimes 
and developments of its national export control, this paper explored several implica-
tions of China’s participation in international regimes for the EU which aimed to pro-
mote effective multilateralism. 
Since the EU and China are both included only in some of the multilateral regimes, and 
hold different and unequal status in these regimes, China often tries to seek dialogue 
with individual EU memeber states either in the UNSC or in these regimes. This is just 
one example of the many disconnects between EU’s policy to promote its norms and the 
actual limited scope of its influence. As to China’s national export control policies, there 
is some gap between China’s commitment and its actual achievements. Also, though 
China and the EU share common goals of preventing nuclear proliferation in the Korean 
peninsula, they tend to apply different exchanges and dialogue since the 2004 Joint Dec-
laration of Non-Proliferation, but suspension of the Eu’s Arms Embargo to China might 
be a step in increasing EU’s positive image in the country. 
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Appendix: China’s Non-proliferation and Export Control Laws and Regulations
(1980--2007)
(Source from MFA website accessed on July 27, 2012: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
wjb/zzjg/jks/fksflfg/t141341.htm)
In the Nuclear Field
Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Materials (1987)
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Export (1997,updated in November 
2006)
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related 
Technologies Export and its control list(1998, the regulation updated in January 2007, 
the list updated in July 2007)
In the Biological Field
Tentative Measures on the Stockpiling and Management of Veterinarian Bacteria 
Culture (1980)
Regulations on the Management of Veterinary Medicines (1987)
Law of the PRC on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (1989,updated 
in 2004)
Law on the Quarantine of Animals and Plants Brought Into or Taken Out of the 
Chinese Territory (1991)
Measures for the Control of Biological Products for Animal Uses (1996)
Procedures for the Safe Administration of Agricultural Biological Gene Engineering 
(1996)
Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and 
Related Equipment and Technologies, and its control list (2002, list updated in 2006) 
Regulations on Administration of Veterinary Drugs (2004)
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In the Chemical Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals, and the 
Controlled Chemicals List (promulgated in 1995, the Controlled Chemicals List was 
updated in 1998)
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of the PRC on the 
Administration of the Controlled Chemicals (1997)
Measures on the Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and 
Technologies and its control list (2002)
In the Missile Field
Regulations of the PRC on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and 
Technologies and the control list (2002)
In the arms export field
Regulations of the PRC on Administration of Arms Export (promulgated in 1997 and 
revised in 2002) and the Military Products Export Control List (2002)
Other Relevant Laws
Amendments to Criminal Law of the PRC (2001)
Regulations on the Import and Export Control of Technologies (2001)
Amended Customs Law of the PRC (1987)
Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC (1996)
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Exit and Entry Frontier Inspections 
(1995)
The Measures for Administration on Import & Export Licensing of Dual-use Items and 
Technologies (2006)
